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ABSTRACT: Educated people everywhere now acknowledge that ecological destruction is 
threatening the future of civilization. While philosophers have concerned themselves with 
environmental problems, they appear to offer little to deal with this crisis. Despite this, I will 
argue that philosophy, and ethics, are absolutely crucial to overcoming this crisis. Philosophy 
has to recover its grand ambitions to achieve a comprehensive understanding of nature and the 
place of humanity within it, and ethics needs to be centrally concerned with the virtues 
required to create and then sustain economic, social and political formations that augment the 
life of ecological communities. Achieving these ends will involve reviving speculative philosophy 
and its quest to forge a synthesis of natural philosophy, history and art to enable humanity to 
redefine its place in the world, both collectively and as individuals, in very practical ways. Such 
a synthesis is required to oppose the corrosion of democracy and to revive the virtues of 
citizenship and the sense of responsibility citizenship entails, but more fundamentally and 
intimately related to such citizenship, to oppose managerialism and the proletarianization of 
the workforce and to revive workmanship and professionalism as the foundations of not only 
economic life, but social and political life. 
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Ulrich Beck, a German sociologist, observed in Risk, Environment & Modernity, a book 
published in 1996: 
The transformation of the unseen side-effects of industrial production into global 
ecological trouble spots is … not at all a problem of the world surrounding us – 
not a so-called ‘environmental problem’ – but a far-reaching institutional crisis of 
industrial society itself. … What previously appeared ‘functional’ and ‘rational’ 
now becomes and appears to be a threat to life, and therefore produces and 
legitimates dysfunctionality and irrationality. … Just as earlier generations lived in 
the age of the stagecoach, so we now and in future are living in the hazardous age 
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of creeping catastrophe. What generations before us discovered despite resistance, 
and had to shout out loud at the world, we have come to take for granted: the 
impending ‘suicide of the species. 1 
Despite growing awareness and concern with environmental problems, and some 
gestures towards cutting greenhouse gas emissions, there has been no significant 
change to this condition. As William Ripple and seven other authors, representing 
15,364 scientists from 184 countries, put it in ‘World Scientists’ Warning to Humanity: 
Second Notice’ in December, 2017: 
Since 1992, with the exception of stabilizing the stratospheric ozone layer, 
humanity has failed to make sufficient progress in generally solving these foreseen 
environmental challenges, and alarmingly, most of them are getting far worse 
(figure 1, file S1). Especially troubling is the current trajectory of potentially 
catastrophic climate change due to rising GHGs from burning fossil fuels (Hansen 
et al. 2013), deforestation (Keenan et al. 2015), and agricultural production— 
particularly from farming ruminants for meat consumption (Ripple et al. 2014). 
Moreover, we have unleashed a mass extinction event, the sixth in roughly 540 
million years, wherein many current life forms could be annihilated or at least 
committed to extinction by the end of this century.2 
The United Nations Emission Gap Report 2018 published in November, 2018, noted that 
greenhouse gas emissions increased in 2017, after three years of stagnation. 
In the face of this, what role could ethics and philosophy play? Beck himself 
suggested that, in the face of this crisis, morality is ‘like a bicycle brake on an 
international jet.’3 It is irrelevant. The same claim could be made of philosophy. 
Despite a large number of publications, including several specialist journals in 
environmental philosophy, ecological problems are now seen primarily as technical 
problems to be solved by technology and markets, with the main driving force being 
the quest by corporations to maximize their profits, even though it is clear that 
technological advances driven by the quest for profits have up until now been the main 
driving force for ecological destruction. The vast majority of the population has 
absolved themselves from taking responsibility for the future. 
There are a number of reasons why this should be the case. The most important is 
the power structure of the global economic and political order. The globalization of the 
                                                          
1 Ulrich Beck, ‘Risk Society and the Provident State’ in Risk, Environment & Modernity, ed. Scott Lash, 
Bronislaw Szerszynski & Brian Wynne, London: Sage, 1996, p.32, 34, 40. 
2 William J. Ripple et.al. ‘World Scientists’ Warning to Humanity: A Second Notice’ in Bioscience, 67(12), 
December, 2017: 1026-1028. 
3 Ulrich Beck, ‘From Industrial Society to Risk Society’ in Cultural Theory and Cultural Change, Mike 
Featherstone ed., London: Sage, 1992, p.106. 
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economy has disempowered the vast majority of the world’s population while massively 
concentrating power in the hands of people who have a vested interest in perpetuating 
the existing system, along with its destructive dynamics. This is an order in which the 
dominant States vie with each other for power within the world system to control 
resources by promoting the growth of their economies, most importantly, by promoting 
free markets and allowing these to determine the direction their societies take. 
Transnational corporations which have been empowered within this system, have been 
supported ideologically by a global network of neoliberal think tanks promoting neo-
classical economics and free markets. With this ideological support, these corporations 
have been able to use their power to free themselves from control by democratic States 
and then to manipulate and control these States, undermining remnants of democracy, 
forcing countries to compete with each other for their investment, extracting their 
wealth while turning State institutions into instruments for their own expansion. 
Capital has been moved to where-ever labor is cheapest, the workforce most effectively 
subjugated and regulations most lax. Change has been so rapid that it is difficult for 
anyone to comprehend what is taking place. The majority of the world’s population is 
struggling to maintain their position within this economy to survive and is in no 
position to concern itself with the environmental sustainability of civilization. The only 
freedom most of them have is in what they choose to buy and consume. And since the 
role through which they now define themselves is that of consumers, they also have a 
vested interest in furthering the expansion of the economy to augment their buying 
power.  
With this state of affairs, Ulrich Beck’s comparison of morality to a bicycle brake on 
an international jet appears apposite, and if this is the case, isn’t philosophy also 
irrelevant?  
Philosophy cannot be dismissed so easily. Nietzsche defined philosophers as 
physicians of culture. If our culture is such that humanity is on a path to a global eco-
catastrophe, and people are not making the required effort to deal with this, or to even 
comprehend it, then our culture is fundamentally diseased. At no time in history has 
philosophy been more important.  
Most importantly, it is incumbent on philosophers to put all the problems, 
including the failure to deal with problems, in perspective. Academics are not doing 
this. Most academics accept the existence of 4000 discipline areas, and are happy to 
carve out new subdisciplines alongside these on the basis of which they can forge their 
academic careers. Philosophers have fallen in with this trend. So we have 
environmental ethics as a sub-discipline of ethics, which is a sub-discipline of 
philosophy. As such, environmental ethics is often dissociated from political and social 
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philosophy, which these in turn usually ignore the rise of economics and the new 
‘discipline’ of public policy studies which have displaced them when it comes to 
influencing political decision-making and defining the goals of society.  
FRAGMENTATION OF WORK AND THE DECAY OF ETHICS 
This pathological state of academia is a manifestation of a more general problem, the 
fragmentation of economic and social life. This problem was identified by the nuclear 
physicist, Max Born. Reflecting on the First and Second World Wars, the holocaust 
and the Cold War, Born was concerned with the paradox that technological progress 
had led to greater brutality and greater threats to humanity. He argued that this was 
due to the fragmentation of work, undermining people’s capacity to think about their 
relationship to the rest of society or to put themselves and their actions in broader 
perspective. Reflecting on the past, Born noted how there was a sameness to human 
history, with peace alternating with war, construction with destruction, growth with 
decline. Then suddenly, three hundred years ago, modern science and technology were 
born. While due to the mind, the advance of science and technology is not controlled 
by the mind. Advances in medicine have extended life, but resulted in catastrophic 
overpopulation. People crowded in cities have lost all contact with nature. Wild life is 
vanishing. Advances in communications technology have resulted in every little crisis 
in the world affecting everywhere else, making reasonable politics impossible. 
However, Born argued that these are problems that could be addressed. He continued: 
The real disease lies deeper. It consists in the breakdown of all ethical principles 
which have evolved in the course of history and preserved a way of life worth 
living even through periods of ferocious warfare and wholesale destruction. … In 
peace, hard work was the foundation of society. A man was proud of what he had 
learned to do and of the things he produced with his hands. Skill and application 
were highly valued. Today there is little left of this. Machines and automation 
have degraded human work and destroyed dignity. Today its purpose and reward 
are money. The money is wanted for buying technical products produced by 
others for the sake of money. … Modern weapons of mass destruction leave no 
place for ethical restrictions and reduce the soldier to a technical killer. The 
devaluation of ethics is due to the length and complication of the path between a 
human action and its final effect. Most workmen know only their special tiny 
manipulation in a special section of the production process and hardly ever see 
the complete product. Naturally they do not feel responsible for this product, or 
for its use. … The most horrid result of this separation of action and effect was 
the annihilation of millions of human beings during the Nazi regime in Germany: 
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the Eichmann type of killers pleaded not guilty because they “did their job” and 
had nothing to do with its ultimate purpose.4 
This fragmentation has accelerated with what the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman in a 
series of brilliant books has analysed as the condition of ‘liquid modernity’. This is what 
underlies not only the global ecological crisis but the triumph of the new global ruling 
class of corporate managers and the subjugation of people and nations to them, the 
precarization of work and concomitantly, ‘moral blindness’.5 Just as individuals who 
were involved in each small step of the process by which millions of people were 
exterminated in death camps during the Second World War saw themselves as merely 
getting on in life by doing their job, myriads of people leading their normal daily lives, 
struggling to maintain their positions in the economy and society, are taking the small 
steps leading inexorably to global environmental destruction.  
If environmental ethics is to be efficacious, this is the problem that must be 
confronted, and for the most part, it has not been confronted.  
RECOVERING PHILOSOPHY’S VOCATION 
That there is a major crisis in philosophy has been well understood by philosophers for 
some time, and many have responded. This has involved re-examination of the history 
of philosophy, including analytic philosophy, efforts to revive Aristotle, Aquinas, Hegel, 
to revive John Dewey’s vision for philosophy, engagement with recent ‘continental’ 
philosophers, and efforts to re-examine and revive Kant and neo-Kantianism. Other 
philosophers have argued that the only way to overcome the crisis is to reject analytic 
philosophy and return to a form of philosophy grounded squarely in the humanities, 
defending phenomenology or hermeneutics.  
However, none of these efforts has got to the root of the problem more successfully 
than C.D. Broad, a leading British philosopher whose career coincided with the eclipse 
of speculative philosophy by what he called ‘critical’ philosophy, which we would now 
equate with analytic philosophy, in two famous papers, the first published in 1924, the 
second in 1947. In the 1924 paper, ‘Critical and Speculative Philosophy’, Broad 
characterized critical philosophy (which evolved into analytic philosophy) as analysis 
and clarification of the basic concepts and presuppositions of ordinary life and of 
science. It was assumed by its proponents that philosophical problems could be treated 
and dealt with in isolation from each other, and that philosophy, like science, could 
                                                          
4 Max Born, My Life and Views, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1968, p.52f. 
5 This is analysed in Zygmunt Bauman and Leonidas Donskis, Moral Blindness: The Loss of Sensitivity in Liquid 
Modernity, Cambridge: Polity, 2013. 
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accumulate indubitable knowledge. On the other hand, speculative philosophers 
attempt to arrive at an overall conception of the nature of the universe and the position 
within it of human beings by taking into account the whole range of human 
experience—scientific, social, ethical, aesthetic, and religious: ‘Its business is to take 
over all aspects of human experience, to reflect upon them, and to try to think out a 
view of Reality as a whole which shall do justice to all of them.’6  
Returning to the problem of the eclipse of speculative philosophy in 1947, in ‘Some 
Methods of Speculative Philosophy’, Broad characterized three methods used by 
philosophers generally that define them as such. These are ‘analysis’ (which had come 
to completely dominate, and which he did not bother to describe any further), 
‘synopsis’ (whereby the inconsistencies between various normally separate domains of 
experience are confronted – ‘synopsis’ means ‘view together’) and uniquely to 
speculative philosophers, ‘synthesis’, which aims to ‘supply a set of concepts and 
principles which shall cover satisfactorily all the various regions of fact which are being 
viewed synoptically.’7 It is important to note that speculative philosophers must use all 
three methods, analytic philosophers only the first two, with a greatly reduced role 
accorded to synopsis. Analytic philosophers tend to give less place to synopses and 
ignore or downplay the significance of the contradictory assumptions of different 
domains of life and experience because they do not take seriously the synoptic 
overviews (often involving narratives that are themselves a form of synthetic thinking) 
that are required to reveal these contradictions, and they deny validity to the synthetic 
forms of reasoning required to develop new conceptual frameworks that could 
transcend these contradictions. 
This is what is required to provide the means for people to comprehend the effects 
of their actions. This requires the transcendence of fragmenting perspectives, a re-
linking of ethics and political philosophy, of philosophy with the rest of culture, 
including the arts, the humanities, the sciences, technology and the culture of everyday 
life, and of each of these with each other in a way that would be easily comprehensible 
to the general public. Is this even possible?  
THE TRADITION OF SPECULATIVE NATURALISM 
In fact it is not only possible, there has been a whole tradition of philosophy that 
                                                          
6 C.D. Broad, ‘Critical and Speculative Philosophy’, Contemporary British Philosophy: Personal Statements (First 
Series), ed. J. H. Muirhead, London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1924: 77-100, p. 96.  
7 Professor C.D. Broad, ‘Some Methods of Speculative Philosophy’, Aristotelian Society Supplement 21, 1947: 1-
32, p.22. 
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emerged in reaction to both the scientific materialism bequeathed by the Seventeenth 
Century scientific revolution and its elaboration in the Eighteenth Century, and the 
Idealist reaction to this, a tradition of natural philosophy, and more specifically, of 
speculative naturalism that has had an enormous influence on the sciences.8 Its most 
prominent originators were Herder, Goethe and Schelling, although each of these 
looked back to Giordano Bruno, Spinoza, Leibniz and Kant. Schelling, a crucial figure 
in this tradition, defined his own work as overcoming the opposition between idealism 
and realism, spiritualism and materialism.9 This tradition was revived in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century by C.S. Peirce, Henri Bergson, Aleksandr 
Bogdanov and Alfred North Whitehead. It is currently being revived again as the 
tradition of the more radical forms of complexity theory, Peircian biosemiotics and, 
uniting these, process metaphysics. Its proponents claim, with some justification, that 
only this tradition has the potential for conceiving humans as conscious beings and 
agents as part of and within the context of the autonomous dynamics of nature and 
society, while revealing the intrinsic value of all life, human and non-human. 
Most importantly, this tradition provides the basis for overcoming the opposition 
between the sciences and the humanities. While Isabelle Stengers and Ilya Prigogine 
are most well known for promoting this on the basis of developments in 
thermodynamics, it has been most vigorously promoted in biosemiotics, ecology and 
eco-semiotics, with Jesper Hoffmeyer and Kalevi Kull being the leading figures in this 
movement. Through this tradition, the place and cognitive claims of narratives can be 
defended as a form of semiosis in nature, while it provides the metaphysical 
foundations for a form of science that makes intelligible the emergence of human 
beings who can understand and orient themselves through narratives. The importance 
of this for ethics is immense. As Alasdair MacIntyre, David Carr and others have 
argued, life is lived as narratives, before narratives are told. It is through narratives that 
we learn how to live. As MacIntyre famously put it,  
I can only answer the question 'What am I to do?' if I can answer the prior 
question 'Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?' We enter human 
society, that is, with one or more imputed characters - roles into which we have 
been drafted - and we have to learn what they are in order to be able to 
understand how others respond to us and how our responses to them are apt to 
                                                          
8 See Arran Gare, ‘The Case for Speculative Naturalism’ in For a New Naturalism, ed. Arran Gare and 
Wayne Hudson, Candor, N.Y.: Telos Press, 2017, pp.9-32; and Arran Gare, ‘Natural Philosophy and the 
Sciences: Challenging Science’s Tunnel Vision’, Philosophies, 2018, 3(4),33; 
doi:10.3390/philosophies3040033. https://www.mdpi.com/2409-9287/3/4/33/html  
9 See Arran Gare, ‘From Kant to Schelling to Process Metaphysics: On the Way to Ecological 
Civilization’, Cosmos & History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, 7(2), 2011: 26-69. 
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be construed. … Deprive children of stories and you leave them unscripted, 
anxious stutterers in their actions and in their words.10 
Particular actions, individuals, roles, institutions, communities and civilizations are 
related to each other through narratives. It is by configuring new narratives and 
refiguring the narratives that people are living out that they change the way they live 
and transform their institutions, their societies and their civilizations.  
The provision of a metaphysics able to reconcile the sciences and the humanities, 
legitimating this role of narratives while providing the perspective from which such 
narratives could be configured, and could provide the basis for a new grand narrative 
to overcome the global ecological crisis.11 To achieve this it should provide the 
perspective from which the achievements, failures, tendencies and potentialities of 
humanity, ranging from civilizations and nations to specific institutions and individuals, 
could be comprehended and re-evaluated. This in turn could orient people to 
interrogate and reconfigure the narratives they are living out, orienting them to take 
their place in history and to take responsibility for creating the future. This is an 
essential condition for mobilizing people for overcoming the problems facing humanity 
while deploying the concepts to create a social, political and economic order that in 
practice could augment rather than undermine the environmental conditions of 
humanity’s existence. 
However, something more is required. It is necessary to mobilize people to aspire 
to achieve such a comprehensive understanding of their place in history and in nature. 
The corrosion of ethics that Born diagnosed has advanced considerably since he wrote 
in the 1960s. Born wrote before the triumph and domination of the world by 
‘neoliberalism’ (really, managerialist market fundamentalism) and the global 
corporatocracy. The idea that the end of life is the quest for money to buy and 
consume more, is all pervasive and has come to be identified with freedom and 
democracy, even as real incomes of most people have been falling and they have been 
losing their security of employment. Concomitantly, there has been a decay of interest 
in any other form of knowledge than how to control things and people in order to 
increase profits. This has led to a transformation in how education is understood and to 
a transformation of educational institutions.12 Education is now an investment and 
universities are run as transnational business enterprises selling training and credentials 
promising to augment their customers’ earning power. How can this trend be reversed?   
                                                          
10 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, Notre Dame, Notre Dame University Press, 2nd ed. 1984, p.216. 
11 Arran Gare, ‘Narratives and the Ethics and Politics of Environmentalism: The Transformative Power of 
Stories’, Theory & Science, Vo1.2, No.1, Spring, 2001, http://theoryandscience.icaap.org/ . 
12 See Bill Readings, The University in Ruins, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1996. 
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ECOLOGICAL ETHICS AND DEMOCRACY 
 Essentially, what we are seeing with the corrosion of ethics and the rise of 
consumerism is a decay of genuine democracy. This itself is partly a result of the 
tendencies identified by Born towards more specialization and greater global 
interconnectedness, rendering reasonable politics impossible. As people feel powerless 
they take less interest in politics, less interest in history and less interest in cosmology. 
As Cornelius Castoriadis, reflecting on the Ancient Greeks, noted, it is only with 
democracy where people began to take responsibility for their society and for the 
creation of the future that history and philosophy become centrally important.13 
However, the loss of interest in these by the general public renders them more 
powerlessness. It is in these circumstances that people have come to define and identify 
themselves almost completely though what they consume. And if people see themselves 
primarily as consumers, then, as noted earlier, what they are most interested in is 
getting more money and getting more for their money. Such an identity is inimical to 
facing up to the broader problems of society and humanity and the means to do so.  
This was the conclusion that has been reached by Pruh, Costanza and Daly, who 
drew the further conclusion that the notion of what it is to be a citizen has to be 
strengthened in order to get people to think about the broader problems of their 
societies. As they noted: 
The citizen preference orientation is currently attenuated to the point of 
invisibility. Yet strengthening it would ineluctably bring people face-to-face with 
the problems of governance, including those of sustainability. Citizens brought 
into confrontation with the stark problems of governing their communities 
through hands-on participation … would be educated in the sources of 
community troubles, in the origins of their way of life, and in the trade-offs that 
must be accepted in any collective choice. With regard to sustainability issues in 
particular, self-governing citizens would more likely learn the ecological costs of 
their community’s lifestyle and socioeconomic character.14 
Pruh, Costanza and Daly argued that ‘strong’ democracy, with active involvement by 
the population in politics, is required to augment responsible citizenship. Following 
Benjamin Barber, they saw this being achieved through an augmentation of the 
representative democracy of nation-states with more direct, participatory forms of local 
democracy.  
                                                          
13 Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy’ in Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy: 
Essays in Political Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. 
14 Thomas Prugh, Robert Costanza, and Herman Daly, The Local Politics of Global Sustainability, Washington 
D.C., Island Press, 2000, p.99.  
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I have argued elsewhere, drawing upon the work of Quentin Skinner, J.G.A. 
Pockock and others, that to sustain democracy and the commitment to the common 
good in opposition to consumerism, will require a revival of republicanism.15 
Republicanism is the commitment to liberty and the civic virtues required to defend it. 
From the perspective of republicanism, liberty is defined in opposition to slavery, the 
condition where people can be harmed by those on whom they are dependent. People 
cannot assert themselves without fear of retribution. Participation in public life, and all 
that is required to make such participation possible, including the defence of 
institutions that protect individuals’ autonomy (most importantly, legal institutions) and 
develop their potential (such as educational institutions), is a duty required of all 
citizens to prevent enslavement. Consumerism is a corruption of such civic virtues, and 
with the disregard by populations of these duties, institutions are being corrupted and 
people as individuals and nations are being enslaved to the corporatocracy, the 
managers of business corporations and their collaborators in politics 
However, what has been offered so far is exploratory, designed to show that 
achieving such strong democracy is a plausible goal, and to show why it is very unlikely 
that environmental problems will be addressed without such strong democracy. And it 
does seem unlikely that the struggle against the fragmentation which has led to the 
corrosion of ethics will be successful unless it is simultaneously part of the struggle for 
democracy. 
Again process metaphysics is of major importance. Democracy implies power in 
the hands of the people capable of collective will formation. It assumes that people are 
free agents, or are at least capable of becoming free agents, able to deliberate to reach a 
consensus on how to act collectively, and then to commit themselves to such collective 
action. All this is unintelligible from the perspective of scientific materialism. While 
there are other philosophies that uphold the notion of free human agency, most of 
these are associated with some form of idealism broadly understood. Only process 
metaphysics (again broadly understood) has defended free agency by questioning 
scientific materialism at its foundations and defending an alternative form of science 
compatible with the humanities, conceiving humans as free agents. Beyond this, 
process metaphysics provides the reference point for considering and choosing what to 
aim at and how to act. It upholds a notion of rationality (in opposition to that of logical 
positivism and related intellectual movements) that can encompass both the 
                                                          
15 Arran Gare, The Philosophical Foundations of Ecological Civilization:  A Manifesto for the Future, London: 
Routledge and Earthscan, 2017, p.156ff. and 215. Green republicanism has been strongly defended by 
Anne Fremaux, After the Anthropocene: Green Republicanism in a Post-Capitalist World, London: Palgrave-
Macmillan (forthcoming). 
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development of scientific ideas and the development of ethical and political ideas, 
thereby undermining the claims of those who would dismiss ethics and politics as 
irrational because they do not conform to ‘scientific’ reasoning. And it upholds a view 
of life, both human and non-human, that values it and reveals how life and the 
conditions for it can be augmented. Finally, and this a dimension that has been little 
explored, by upholding on naturalistic foundations the status of narratives as the core of 
actions, individual and collective, process metaphysics provides a way of forming a 
collective will while conceiving humans as part of nature and without reducing people 
to instruments.  
Scientific materialism, by denying the validity of narratives, has served to uphold 
hidden, monologic narratives that reduce people to instruments of power elites, while 
process metaphysics cultivates self-reflective subjects able to form themselves through 
explicitly formulated, dialogic narratives. Such narratives give a place to competing 
perspectives, competing versions of themselves, and a place for their continual 
questioning and reformulation by those who are living them out. The practice of 
democracy involves making these narratives and their different versions explicit, 
socializing people to understand, choose between and commit themselves to these 
narratives, and then providing them with the knowledge and means to participate in 
questioning and revising them.  
 ‘FEELING FOR THE WHOLE’ AS THE ULTIMATE VIRTUE 
The problem still remains, however, that such strong democracy is not yet seen as 
attractive enough to the general population for it to really challenge the consumerism 
of neo-liberal capitalism. Furthermore, the conditions of sustaining democracy have 
not been fully considered. Traditionally, democracy has been criticized, and what 
democracies there have been have decayed, because people generally are not 
sufficiently committed to the common good. Democratic societies have had a tendency 
to tear themselves apart through internal dissension or simply decay through excessive 
egoism. What seems to be lacking is a compelling ethics to make democracy both 
possible and sustainable. This is clearly a major problem at present. Born’s point, that 
the lack of ethics associated with the fragmentation of people’s work, still needs to be 
addressed in order to develop the forms of thinking and motivation required if people 
are going to struggle for and then sustain democracy. How can this be done? 
Guidance in this regard is provided by the theorist of architecture and town 
planning, Christopher Alexander. Alexander has been concerned to diagnose the 
failure of modernist and postmodernist architecture to produce beautiful buildings, 
beautiful built-up environments and vibrant communities. He came to the conclusion 
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that the problem lies in the conception of the world or world-picture assumed by 
architects, a world-picture ‘that essentially makes it impossible to make buildings well.’ 
As he put it: 
I believe that we have a residue of a world-picture which is essentially mechanical 
in nature – what we might call the mechanistic-rationalist world-picture. … Like 
an infection it has entered us, it affects our actions, it affects our morals, it affects 
our sense of beauty. It controls the way we think when we try to make buildings 
and – in my view – it has made the making of beautiful buildings all but 
impossible.16   
To diagnose the failures and overcome the influence of this world-picture, Alexander 
argued for an alternative view of the world, one centering on the concept of order. This 
view allows that there are different degrees of life in various wholes such that ‘statements 
about relative degree of  harmony, or life, or wholeness – basic aspects of  order – are understood as 
potentially true or false.’17 More importantly where developing an ecological ethics is 
concerned, Alexander has argued that ‘feeling’ is central to the process of building 
environments which are alive and beautiful and in appreciating beauty and life (which 
for Alexander are close to being equivalent: what we see as more beautiful is what we 
see as more alive and as conducive to life).  
This is a view which accords with and is supported by the process metaphysics of 
C.S. Peirce and A.N. Whitehead. Each of these accorded a central place to feeling, 
with Peirce arguing that while logic is a branch of ethics, ethics is a branch of 
aesthetics. Whitehead argued in Process and Reality that Kant had produced an 
inadequate transcendental aesthetic, that is, an inadequate analysis of the most basic 
forms of experience. Whitehead presented his own work as an attempt to overcome this 
failure and thereby to provide more adequate solutions to every aspect of philosophy 
with which Kant had been concerned. Whitehead criticized Kant for failing to 
consider adequately the most primitive dimension of experience, feeling, which 
Whitehead took to be central to the concrescence of the primacy existents, actual 
occasions. Effectively, Whitehead was claiming that an adequate appreciation and 
analysis of feeling would provide the basis for characterizing physical existence, life and 
beauty and provide a foundation for ethics. As he grandly proclaimed: 
The philosophy of organism aspires to construct a critique of pure feeling, in the 
philosophical position in which Kant put his Critique of  Pure Reason. This should 
also supersede the remaining Critiques required in the Kantian philosophy. Thus 
                                                          
16 Christopher Alexander, The Nature of Order: An Essay on the Art of Building and the Nature of the Universe, Book 
One, The Phenomenon of Life, Berkeley: The Center for Environmental Structure, 2002, p.7f. 
17 Alexander, The Nature of Order: Book One, p.22. 
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in the organic philosophy Kant’s ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ becomes a distorted 
fragment of what should have been his main topic.18 
Whitehead characterized beauty only briefly in a concluding chapter of Adventures of 
Ideas. Alexander’s work can be taken as a vindication and advance of Whitehead’s 
claims that feeling is central to understanding physical existence, life and art and is 
central to ethics, and that beauty and the quest to augment it are centrally important to 
all this. And since for Alexander, building is a process within nature with the same 
ontological status as any other pattern, he can also be regarded as having contributed 
to understanding the role of feeling in physical existence conceived primarily as 
process. In developing his insights into feeling, wholeness, centres, life and beauty in 
building, in the built environment and in life more generally, Alexander’s work can be 
taken as a major contribution to the revival of process metaphysics.19 
OVERCOMING MANAGERIALISM 
According to Alexander, one of the most pernicious ways in which the mechanistic 
world-picture has influenced architecture has been the way architects, financiers, 
builders, tradesmen and those who will live in the buildings relate to each other. 
Building has been infected by Taylorism. Taylorism is associated in most people’s 
minds with the Fordist production line. It was a doctrine of the early twentieth century, 
supported not only by Ford, but also by Lenin, and it led to great advances in 
productivity in some areas, at the expense of dehumanizing work. It is usually thought 
to be obsolete as production lines are facilitating the replacement of people by 
computerized robots, while people are now deployed in more creative, less soul 
destroying work. But Alexander pointed out that Frederick Taylor, the founder of 
Taylorism, was arguing for something more basic, and in this regard his ideas are far 
from dead; they are alive and growing in influence. As he noted:  
What we know as modern bureaucracy – American, British, Russian, Swedish, or 
Chinese – with its system of rules, questions and answers, which make little 
provision for human actuality or human difference, came from the application of 
Frederick Taylor’s ideas to large human institutions. What we know as modern 
construction, is the application of Taylorism to the assembly of physical 
components. What we know as modern agriculture, lies in the application of 
Taylor’s ideas to farms, animals, crops, water resources, fertilizers, and machines 
                                                          
18 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, [1929] Corrected Edition, ed. David Ray Griffin and 
Donald W. Sherburne, New York: The Free Press, 1978, p.113. 
19 As argued in Arran Gare, ‘Architecture and the Global Ecological Crisis: From Heidegger to 
Christopher Alexander, The Structurist, No. 43/44, 2003-2004 – special issue: ‘Toward an Ecological Ethos 
in Art and Architecture’. 
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on the land.20  
Taylorism involves as much as possible placing knowledge and decision-making in the 
hands of managers. Workers are to be reduced to mere instruments, to cogs in the 
machine. ‘Work’ is reduced to mere ‘labour’, as Hannah Arendt characterized these in 
The Human Condition.21 Taylorist managerialism involves undermining not only 
craftsmanship, but also professionalism in work and all that is involved in this. 
Taylorism is in fact the apogee of the fragmentation of work which Born diagnosed as 
the root cause of the decay of ethics.   
In architecture the effects of this fragmentation are clear. Instead of workers 
thinking about how their work will contribute to the building and to the lives of those 
who will live or use the building, they follow the instructions of the builder who in turn 
is implementing the design of the architect. The design is produced to impress those 
who provide finance, with the main concern being how pictures will look in magazines. 
The ultimate concern is the profitability to the investor. All decisions about the final 
product are made before the building begins. As a consequence, builders no longer 
produce beautiful buildings and beautiful built-up environments which are conducive 
to life and vibrant communities. We now have ugly buildings that are inimical to life 
and destroy community. By contrasting old and new architecture, Alexander has been 
able to work out what is missing and has called for a return to the old ways of building. 
What would this involve? Building is the generation of form, that is, 
morphogenesis. Alexander argued that the kind of morphogenesis that produces living 
structures takes place through a process of structure preserving transformations in 
which centres are generated in such a way that they augment each other. First and 
foremost, a return to the old ways would involve developing a feel for the whole and of 
how its centres relate to each other. That the development of such feeling is essential to 
good building is a central conclusion of Alexander’s work. As he put it: ‘I assert, simply, 
that all living process hinges on the production of deep feeling. And I assert that this 
one idea encapsulates all the other ideas, and covers all aspects of the living process.’22 
Wholeness and deep structure are enormously difficult to see, Alexander noted, 
particularly in real world situations, and our current modes of perception are not 
attuned to seeing the wholeness around us. Yet, to find agreement, it is imperative that 
we have a workable and practical method of seeing wholeness and assessing the degree 
to which a proposed ‘next step’ does increase the life and wholeness of an evolving 
                                                          
20 Christopher Alexander, The Nature of Order: An Essay on the Art of Building and the Nature of the Universe, Book 
Two, The Process of Creating Life, Berkeley: The Center for Environmental Structure, 2002, p.515. 
21 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. 
22 Alexander, The Nature of Order: Book Two, p.370. 
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structure. While this seems to be incredibly difficult, people in traditional societies did 
manage these tasks. How were they able to do this? Alexander described what is 
involved: 
Each observer is able to judge the whole, to see and experience the whole, by 
paying attention to the question: Is the emerging building increasing my own 
wholeness? Is it increasing the feeling I experience when I am in touch with that 
thing? … [T] he extent to which a building is coming to life can be steered by the 
extent to which it has deep feeling in it, deep feeling that we experience. This can 
be done for any emerging entity. … The living process can therefore be steered, 
kept on course towards the authentic whole, when the builder consistently uses 
the emerging feeling of the whole as the origin of his insight, as the guiding light 
at the end of the tunnel by which he steers.23  
It is important to clarify what Alexander means by ‘feeling’ here. Because people 
are dominated by the mechanistic view of the world, language has been contaminated 
so that feelings tend to be thought of as subjective emotional states, making it difficult 
to appreciate what this feeling for the whole is. But, Alexander argued, ‘feeling’ should 
not be regarded as merely subjective or equated with emotion. ‘It is a feeling in the 
singular, which comes from the whole’ he explained. ‘It arises in us, but it originates in 
the wholeness which is actually there. The process of respecting and extending and 
creating the whole, and the process of using feeling, are one and the same. Real feeling, 
true feeling, is the experience of the whole.’24 Alexander argues that it was because 
traditional builders worked on the basis of this sense of the whole that they produced 
beautiful buildings: ‘They paid attention to the feeling of the emerging structure … 
Guided by feeling, they were able to make each small step count in the emergence of a 
new unfolding whole.’25  
What I am suggesting here is that this point illuminates the connection between 
work and ethics alluded to by Born, while at the same time vindicating Whitehead’s 
claims concerning the importance of feeling to ethics and aesthetics and beauty to 
civilization. Alexander has shown that something was understood in the past that has 
now been lost, and he has shown what needs to be recovered. Recovering this will 
involve cultivating a feeling for the whole and using to this not only to guide building, 
but to appreciate what an abomination work is when people are reduced to mere 
instruments of others.  
Alexander was not content to merely resurrect architecture and town planning; he 
                                                          
23 Alexander, The Nature of Order: Book Two, p.370f. 
24 Alexander, The Nature of Order: Book Two, p.371. 
25 Alexander, The Nature of Order: Book Two, p.371. 
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believed that work to create beautiful built environments could revive and reinvigorate 
communities, transform society and promote an ecological ethics. He suggested that 
this model for acting and building could be taken up throughout society and could 
then displace Taylorism. This would involve a revival of craftsmanship and 
professionalism where people were no longer reduced to instruments but would see 
themselves as participating in the broader processes of form generation or 
‘morphogenesis’. This can be extended to all occupations. The same feeling for the 
whole is required of teachers, for instance, so that in their work they also should 
cultivate a sense of wholeness in their self-formation through providing the conditions 
for and augment the self-formation of their students as individuals and as members of 
communities, local, national and international. This cultivation of the ability to feel the 
whole and to act accordingly, Alexander argues, is crucially important for changing our 
relationship to the land. As he put it: 
… we shall all gradually come to feel a concrete and realistic obligation to make 
sure that every action taken, by anyone, in any place, always, heals the land. A 
widespread ethical change begins to appear. Healing the land is understood by 
more and more people: Throughout society, slowly each person comes to 
recognize his or her fundamental obligation to make sure that in every act of 
every kind, each person does what he or she can do to heal the land and to 
regenerate, shape, form, decorate, and improve the living Earth of which it is 
part.26 
WORK, DEMOCRACY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
The feel for the whole required by and engendered by work as Alexander described it 
is, I am suggesting, the core of the ethics associated with work that Born was lamenting 
has been eroded and largely lost. Alexander is charting a course to reverse this erosion. 
In this, Alexander’s ideas concur with and provide support efforts to revive virtue 
ethics, for instance, as in Robert Solomon’s defence of holism in business ethics. ‘The 
ultimate aim of the Aristotelian approach to business’ Solomon argued ‘is to cultivate 
whole human beings.’ ‘This search for wholeness in the individual employee or 
manager extends to the corporation itself ’ he continued. ‘Holism … is concern for the 
whole rather than some of its parts, and emphasis on the big picture rather than the 
analysis of narrowly circumscribed details such as profits.’ This leads to a different 
understanding of ethics. ‘We have to reject all those false dichotomies and antagonisms 
between business and ethics, between profit and doing good, between personal and 
                                                          
26 Alexander, The Nature of Order: Book Two, p.548. 
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corporate values and virtues.’27  
Such holism could provide the conditions for the struggle for freedom and 
democracy. As Alexander argued, morphogenesis in society which augments life and 
the community both requires people who are free to participate in this morphogenesis 
and provides the conditions for this freedom. Freedom, it could be argued, is the 
condition for people being able to live and act in accordance with what they feel to be 
right. It is the condition for them to be able to live a fully human life, a life in which 
they can gain a sense of themselves through their participation in creating and 
augmenting the life of their communities and societies, and participating in the 
formation of and augmenting the life of humanity and the rest of nature. Only with 
such freedom or liberty, Alexander pointed out, can we have an unfolding of the 
creative process of generating form guided by feeling for the whole:  
Why is freedom associated with the morphogenetic character of social processes? 
Because it is the shape-creating, organization-generating, aspect of process which 
ultimately allows people to do what they want, what they desire, what they need, 
and what is deeply adapted to life as it is lived and to experience as it is felt. The 
humanity of the environment comes about only when the processes are 
morphogenetic, are whole seeking, are placed in a context that gradually allows 
people to work towards a living whole in which each person plays a part.28  
Participation in morphogenesis and freedom presuppose and augment each other. 
A feeling for particular wholes tends to generate feeling for ever broader wholes, from 
local communities to society, to humanity and to the rest of nature. The feeling for 
these wholes in turn would engender an appreciation of the value of liberty to 
participate in creating and participating in these living wholes. This is a freedom 
oriented towards the common good. It is this feeling for and commitment to the 
common good which is required for people to be able to understand each other’s points 
of view and reach a consensus on what goals to aim at the are worth striving for.  
An ethics grounded in unfragmented, creative forms of work would then augment 
other virtues required for upholding and sustaining democracy. Earlier I suggested that 
democracy requires explicitly formulated, dialogic narratives to orient people for action 
and provide a reference point for questioning and interrogating institutions and social 
goals. In recent years, associated with the postmodern condition, people’s capacity to 
                                                          
27 Robert C. Solomon, Ethics and Excellence: Cooperation and Integrity in Business, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1992, p.180. 
28 Alexander, The Nature of Order: Book Two, p.509. 
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entertain, let alone produce, complex narratives has decayed.29 Consequently, people 
are less and less able to orient themselves through narratives, to relate their own lives to 
the lives of others, to traditions and to the goals of institutions and broader 
communities of which they are part. They are also less able to see their own narratives 
from the perspective of others and less able to bring the narratives they are living out 
into question. The decay of narrative, particularly historical narrative, appears to be 
connected to the disempowerment of people; but the influence is mutual since the 
inability of people to formulate narratives to define their place in history also severely 
limits their capacity to unite and mobilize to achieve common goals, thus weakening 
democracy. What I am suggesting is that the decay in the capacity to produce 
narratives is at least partly a consequence of the fragmentation of work and the 
associated loss of the ability to achieve a feeling for the whole. The development of this 
feeling would at the same time facilitate people’s capacity to understand and participate 
in the production of narratives.  
In particular, feeling for diverse wholes should make it easier for people to 
formulate narratives which allow for a multiplicity of centres of action, thereby making 
it easier for people to comprehend and engage with multi-leveled democracy. Pruh, 
Costanza and Daly in promoting strong democracy were supporting democracy at 
more than one level. In this work, however, they focused mostly on USA and its 
problems, and did not consider the relationship between local democracy and the 
global system. As I noted in the introduction, the present global system is dominated by 
an immanent logic which threatens environmental destruction on a massive scale. This 
is a problem that has to be addressed if we are to create a sustainable world-order. 
Daly, along with John Cobb, has addressed this problem more adequately elsewhere, 
arguing for a new world-order organized into ‘communities of communities’.30 
Alexander argued that life is characterized by the development of mutually enhancing 
centres at multiple scales. Although he was primarily concerned with buildings, 
Alexander believed this analysis could be generalized. It can be generalized to human 
communities and ecosystems. It would follow that a vibrant human community or a 
vibrant ecosystem would also consist of multiple reinforcing centres and multiple levels. 
The cultivation of a feeling for wholes in work involves a feeling not only for the whole 
but also for centres and how they augment each other. Developing this would greatly 
facilitate the ability to recognize and appreciate multiple mutually augmenting centres 
                                                          
29 See Arran Gare, ‘Narratives and Culture: The Role of Stories in Self-Creation’, Telos, Issue 121, Winter, 
2002, pp.80-101: 80f. 
30 Herman E. Daly and John B. Cobb, For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy Toward Community, the 
Environment, and the a Sustainable Future, Boston: Beacon Press, 1994, p.176ff. 
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in society and in the world, and the need to support such centres. This would facilitate 
the kind of thinking required to comprehend and support such a global order. 
As the ethical corrosion brought about by the fragmentation of work has been 
associated with and furthered the decay of democracy, overcoming this fragmentation 
by cultivating a feeling for the whole as the basis for living should facilitate the revival 
of democracy. This is required to relate people’s individual lives, politics and 
environmental issues at every level, from the local to the global, to enable people to 
organize and function within democracies while supporting and augmenting each 
other’s liberty to contribute to rather than undermining the global ecosystem. It is what 
is required to think globally while acting locally in such a way that acting locally does 
really incorporate global thinking.  
TOWARDS AN ECOLOGICAL CIVILIZATION 
In the introduction to this paper I described briefly the dynamics of the global system 
which is driving people towards the destruction of their global environment. An 
ecological ethics needs to consider not only what we should do if the social order in 
which we are living makes it extremely difficult for us to live in a way that contributes 
to rather than undermines the ecological processes conducive to human life, but how 
to change this social order. I have attempted to show through this paper that process 
metaphysics could provide the form of ecological ethics required to effect this 
transformation. Can this proposal be taken seriously? Beck’s skepticism about ethics is 
justified if morality is conceived of in its present form as constraint on the self-interest 
of individuals, examined and sometimes defended by moral philosophy, a subdiscipline 
of philosophy, which is just one discipline among others. But this is part of the 
fragmentation of culture, life and work which has undermined ethics. If process 
metaphysics can provide the foundations for ecological ethics, it is because it is first and 
foremost a rebellion against this fragmentation. To carry through this rebellion, it must 
do more than provide a unifying discourse which contextualizes ethics. It has to inspire 
people to act. I have suggested that the vision that needs to be upheld is of democracy; 
genuine democracy, against domination of the world by the forces of the market and 
those who have wealth. The struggle against environmental destruction should be seen 
as a struggle for liberty and democracy by communities ranging from the local to the 
global. This will involve the re-figuration of the narratives people, as individuals and 
communities, are living out on the basis of a new vision of the future, one in which 
people will no longer be enslaved by market forces and will be able to create 
ecologically sustainable societies. This by itself is unlikely to be a challenge to the 
consumerism which now dominates people throughout most of the world. Max Born 
was right. People’s ethics in the past was grounded in work, and the fragmentation of 
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work has corroded any effective ethics. Alexander’s proposals have provided a concrete 
goal for people to aim at, to change the nature of the work so that people are no longer 
reduced to instruments of Taylorist management structures, but can appreciate the 
products of their work as participation in the formation of life. 
Could this provide the basis for an ecological ethics that would be effective? 
Alexander suggested that patterns equivalent to small, snippable genes, could spread 
through society and transform it. If the spreading of new patterns at local levels could 
bring about greater capacity for people to achieve solidarity in developing such 
patterns, this could bring about global changes, producing social environments 
conducive to the further development of such patterns. This should foster the 
development of people with a feel for the whole who, for this reason, could organize 
democratically and maintain democratic structures. What is important here is that 
ecological ethics not be seen merely in relation to individuals, but in relation to 
institutions, organizations and communities; that is, in relation to political philosophy. 
Ethics should be seen in relation to the virtues required to sustain ecologically 
sustainable social forms as the condition for the flourishing of life. Conversely, politics 
should not be conceived purely in terms of power and organizing to achieve specific 
goals, but should be concerned centrally with cultivating the people committed to 
fostering life. It is in this way that process metaphysics, which can integrate all these 
aspects, could provide ethics that could mobilize people to effective action to avoid an 
ecological catastrophe and create an ecological civilization.  
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